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Nobody’s Business: A Novel Theory of the
Anonymous First Amendment
BY JORDAN WALLACE-WOLF*

Abstract
Namelessness is a double-edged sword. It can be a way of avoiding
prejudice and focusing attention on one’s ideas, but it can also be a license
to defame and misinform. These points have been widely discussed. Still,
the breadth of these discussions has left some of the depths unplumbed, because rarely is the question explicitly faced: what is the normative significance of namelessness itself, as opposed to its effects under different conditions? My answer is that anonymity is an evasion of responsibility for one’s
conduct. Persons should ordinarily be held responsible for what they do, but
in some cases, where there is sufficient justification, they may enjoy a privilege not to be. One such privilege—the privilege to participate in community thinking—is based in the First Amendment interest that persons have in
developing their thinking with others without having to be held responsible
for it. I argue that this privilege was not applicable eleven years ago to the
challengers in Doe v. Reed and is, for somewhat similar reasons, not applicable to the challengers in the Supreme Court’s most recent anonymity case:
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta. I argue it was wrongly decided.
Keywords: Anonymity, Free Speech, First Amendment, Freedom of
Association, Supreme Court, Responsibility, Grand Juries, Petit Juries, Ballot Initiatives, Doe v. Reed, Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta,
Secret Ballot, Representative Democracy, Names, Privileges, Constitutional
Law
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I. Introduction
Stories of all kinds suppose that names have power. According to some
religions, God is too great to be named. In the world of Harry Potter, Voldemort is able to grow in power by making ordinary people too afraid to say
his name. Rumpelstiltskin will only allow the princess to keep her child if
she can guess his name. Superman can only defeat Mister Mxyzptlk by getting him to say his name backwards.
The power of names is not just a product of the imagination. A name
can grab someone’s attention, formalize a contract, assert one’s individuality, express affection, and signal allegiances and lineages. A name’s absence
is just as consequential. The January 2021 vote by House Republicans to
keep Liz Cheney in her leadership position had a distinct significance due to
its being anonymous.1 Additional examples are easy to find. Authoring a
book in one’s own name is different from authoring it anonymously;2
1. This vote suggested that private views of Trump’s conduct were at least somewhat in
competition with the political incentives to support him. It also suggested the weakness of her support, which is now being highlighted in a second challenge to her position in the Republican caucus.
See Catie Edmondson & Nicholas Fandos, House Republicans Choose to Keep Liz Cheney in Leadership, in some David Morgan, House Republicans Ready Vote on Trump Critic Cheney’s Leadership Post, REUTERS (May 4, 2021, 2:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/house-republicans-ready-vote-trump-critics-leadership-post-sources-2021-05-04/.
2. Many authors publish under a pseudonym. Pseudonyms introduce complications that I
will deliberately leave aside in this paper, but some uses of them are illustrative since someone who
uses a pseudonym does not speak in their own name. See Joseph Fulda, The Ethics of
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reporting a crime in one’s own name is different from giving an anonymous
tip;3 and writing one’s own opinion is different from joining a per curiam
opinion.4
But what exactly is the difference between acting in one’s name and
not? In one sense, this question is easy to answer. The difference is one of
connectivity or attributability.5 When one writes a note and signs it, the content and its author can be linked up. The words can be attributed to them.
By contrast, an anonymous note separates its content from its author. The
words are disowned; they are not anyone’s in particular.6
However, the preceding question has a more difficult side to it: what is
the difference in normative significance between acting in one’s name and
not? That is, what is the importance of anonymity such that it is sometimes
worth protecting and sometimes not?
The vast majority of legal scholarship and judicial opinions about anonymity assumes that the answer to this hard question is straightforward: the
importance of a person being dissociated from what they say lies exclusively
in the effects.7 For example, anonymity may preclude unfair retaliation and
incentivize unpopular speech, but it may also enable harassment and misinformation.8
From this assumption, it follows that the legal rules regarding anonymity should be evaluated through a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis.9 They
should encourage or discourage anonymity to produce the best overall consequences. Many commentators make this point by saying that anonymity

Pseudonymous Publication, 16 J. OF INFO. ETHICS 75 (2007). See also, Alexandra Schwartz, The
“Unmasking”
of
Elena
Ferrante,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(Oct.
3,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-unmasking-of-elena-ferrante (discussing the identification of a popular novelist who had written under a pseudonym).
3. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014) (holding that an anonymous tip may satisfy
the requirement of reasonable suspicion when sufficient indicia of reliability are present, such as
the identity of the car that was reported to have driven dangerously).
4. See Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per
Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2012) (arguing that courts have reason not to speak
as institutions and should generally speak through the opinions of particular judges).
5. See Julie Ponesse, The Ties that Blind: Conceptualizing Anonymity, 45 J. OF SOC. PHIL.
304 (2014); Jeffrey Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691, 720-22
(2015); Kathleen A. Wallace, Anonymity, 1 ETHICS AND INFO. TECH. 21 (1999).
6. There are other kinds of important anonymous activities, like anonymous reading, but I
focus on speech at this point for ease of exposition.
7. See infra Section I (offering examples).
8. These points are ubiquitous in scholarship about anonymity. See, e.g., Lyrissa Lidsky &
Thomas Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537
(2007). Courts focus heavily on the chance of reprisals against speakers. See Am. for Prosperity
Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355
(1995); Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (discussing anonymity as the concealment of one’s face rather than one’s name); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (a foundational precedent for anonymous speech that focuses on the risks of reprisals).
9. See infra Section I.A (giving examples of this assumption).
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or anonymity rules are tools and that their use should be evaluated according
to an instrumental logic. They should be used if they are the right tool for
the job (i.e., when they will produce the best outcome relative to other doctrines or rules).10
These claims about anonymity—the instrumental or tool view—may
seem unremarkable, but I think that is flawed. In this paper I will argue that
a different tool—the privileged participation view—is superior and that it
can be used to provide improved analyses of anonymity practices in the law.
Some motivation for resisting the instrumental view is that, intuitively,
names have a special significance to a person as it pertains to their identity;
hence, the absence of a name is likely similarly significant. Support for this
intuition is that some uses of anonymity seem to be prohibited for reasons
that have less to do with the effects it would have and more to do with the
role that anonymity plays in protecting thought. For example, legislative
representatives cannot vote on legislation anonymously, even if this would
lead to better decision-making or other good consequences. I think this is
because the valuable role that representatives play in a democracy is per se
incompatible with anonymity.11 On the other hand, I think that the right to
read anonymously is not justified by the good consequences it may have, but
rather by the unique role that anonymous reading plays in a society animated
by the values of the First Amendment.
The view I favor vindicates these two intuitions. The importance of a
person being dissociated from what they say does not lie exclusively in the
effects that such a dissociation will have on other normatively important
goals and values, such as preventing reprisals or incentivizing valuable
speech. Rather, my claim is that this dissociation has a distinct and determinate normative significance in itself.
Names are how we think about a person and link that person’s conduct
to the person. This kind of linking is significant because it is the basic initial
way in which we hold others responsible for what they do. That is, we hold
persons responsible for what they do—whether good or bad, right or
wrong—by thinking that they have done it. We may, of course, have cause
to go further and praise or criticize them, or even reward or punish them for
what they have done. However, all of these steps depend on first attributing

10. E.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of Surveillance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 95, 145 (2017) (“[c]ommunicative anonymity is a core part of freedom in
a democratic state and a critical tool for those who seek freedom from nondemocratic states.”);
Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501, 538 (2013) (“[t]here is good reason
why anonymity and generativity are key pressure points. Both are tools…”); Saul Levmore, The
Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191 (1996).
11. Perhaps the response will be that open voting by legislators will always produce the best
consequences. That may be true, but my point is that it does not seem we have to tally up the
consequences of secret voting by legislators to know that it is not permitted. I discuss this more at
the beginning of Section II.
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the action to them and so altering, whether slightly or greatly, our view of
who they are. Names are essential to this attribution as they are how we
perceive the person.12 This perception is a name’s source of power.
Generally, we hold persons responsible by mentally “filing” their actions under their name. When anonymity precludes such a filing by suppressing the relevant name, it precludes being held responsible for what one
does. Accordingly, anonymity does not just keep one’s identity from being
known, anonymity defeats responsibility. This is its distinctive normative
significance.
Moreover, since holding persons responsible for what they do is an important moral activity—after all, why should persons not be held responsible
for what they are responsible for?—anonymity will be presumptively wrongful. However, this presumption can be defeated in some circumstances, in
which case there will be a privilege to be anonymous. One such privilege is
based on the importance of thinking and not, as the leading view would have
it, on the need to produce the overall best consequences. Thinking is both
heavily experimental and social. Persons need to be able to try out their ideas
with others, but if doing so is conditioned on being held responsible for what
one says, one may be deterred from coming forward. Hence, persons should
enjoy a privilege, based in the First Amendment, to anonymously participate
in community thinking.13 This is the essence of the privileged participation
view.
After establishing this theoretical claim, I apply it to various anonymity
practices to show how it reshapes the kind of arguments that can and should
be given for them. Considering these anonymity practices also provides an
opportunity for me to illustrate the kind of factors that determine whether
someone can claim the privilege to participate in community thinking anonymously.
First, I consider anonymous speaking and reading. Free speech doctrine
currently protects a right to do both, and the privileged participation view
supports that result. After all, persons may need to make contact with ideas
and arguments that are found among a community of thinkers without
thereby taking a position within that community. Second, I turn to various
kinds of formal democratic participation. I argue that the privileged participation view provides some support for the secret ballot, but it does not permit
representatives to vote anonymously nor does it permit citizens to suppress

12. There is no doubt that one can see someone do something and chastise that person for it
without knowing their name, but without their name one cannot integrate the interaction into the
person’s biography. By contrast, if one knows a person’s name then one can, in principle, transmit
it by speech “Oh Emily? I once saw her do such and such…”
13. See, e.g., JANNA MALAMUD SMITH, PRIVATE MATTERS: IN DEFENSE OF THE PERSONAL
LIFE loc. 556 (1997) (ebook) (“[a]nonymity, you might say, is privacy for people who don’t want
to be really alone.”).
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access to their signatures in favor of a ballot initiative.14 Next, I illustrate
how the arguments in John Doe v. Reed are applicable to Americans for
Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta.15 I argue that the California disclosure requirements at issue in that case should be upheld.
The organization of this Article is as follows: Section I illustrates the
view that anonymity is a tool and then offers an alternative view: the privileged participation view. I illustrate and defend the privileged participation
view by showing how it justifies anonymous speaking and reading. In Section II, I offer a sketched theory of representative democracy in the course
of discussing the three democratic practices listed above: voting in elections
by citizens, legislative voting by representatives, and voting on ballot initiatives. I argue that it is proper for the first to be anonymous, but that the latter
two must be done openly. I then argue that similar arguments can be made
to support upholding the disclosure laws in Bonta.

II. Theoretical Foundations
A. The Going View: Anonymity is Significant Only Because of its
Consequences for Other Goals and Goods

In this section, I will offer some examples of the assumption that anonymity is only contingently normatively significant (i.e., that it does not have
a definite, built-in significance). I do so not only to illustrate the nature of
this assumption and its prevalence, but also to point out some of the insights
that it has generated as well as to highlight some questions it has produced.
The assumption I identify finds clear, albeit implicit, expression in an
article by Lyrissa Lidsky and Thomas Cotter.16 Their focus is on anonymous
speech and the general right to engage in it. They do not suppose that anonymity has a built-in moral significance that can be consulted to evaluate the
appropriateness of such a right. Instead, they assume that such a right will
be justified or not, depending on the effects that anonymity would have
across speakers and speech situations in the aggregate, as well as the relative
importance of those effects.17 Thus, determining whether there is justification for anonymous speech requires a grand accounting. Costs and benefits
are to be totaled up, and if the benefits sufficiently outweigh the costs to a
greater degree than other options, anonymity is justified for speech.

14. John Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (holding that there is no general First Amendment
requirement for the signatories of a ballot initiative to be kept from the public).
15. Am. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. —- (2021).
16. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 8 (this article is cited by other scholars focusing on privacy and anonymity); See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 815, 823 n.27 (2013) (citing and elaborating on Lidsky and Cotter).
17. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 8, at 1159.
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As Lidsky and Cotter acknowledge, such a grand accounting is difficult
to carry out, because it depends on empirical facts that are hard to pin down.18
Lidsky and Cotter state that:
In theory, audiences could be either better or worse off under a regime
that grants strong protection to anonymous speech, as opposed to one that
grants only weak protection, depending upon which effect—the production
of more socially valuable speech, or the production of more harmful, though
discounted, speech—predominates.19
In the interest of reaching a more definitive judgment, they assume
that persons are savvy and will approach anonymous speech with the correct
amount of caution.20 They also assume that anonymity is a superior way of
incentivizing speech, compared to other methods, such as greater institutional protections and consequences for retaliation against speakers.21
The empirical dependencies of their arguments are evidence of the assumption that anonymity has no inherent normative significance and that it
is to be evaluated situationally. Put another way, anonymity is, in their view,
the preferred way of calling forth a certain balance of good speech. But like
any tool, anonymity is only good given how things are now. Perhaps in the
future, for all their argument claims, greater tolerance and protections against
retaliation will make a right to anonymous speech unnecessary. By contrast,
I will argue that anonymity protects speech in a distinct way, and that this
kind of protection is not made obsolete by greater tolerance or stricter laws
against retaliation.22
A bigger problem though, and one that Lidsky and Cotter also
acknowledge, is the need for an evaluative framework. That is, even if we
had rock solid empirical evidence of how anonymity alters the content and
quantity of certain kinds of speech, we still need to know how much bad
anonymous speech can be tolerated to secure some amount of valuable
speech that would not be spoken without the protection of anonymity. But
the very notion of a tradeoff is out of place, given that the constitutionally
established value of the latter kind of speech is not usually balanced against

18. Id. at 1577.
19. Id. at 1539-40.
20. Id. at 1588.
21. Id. at 1578 (“[i]ndeed, for this class of speakers, a system that simultaneously compelled
disclosure of authorial identity and effectively prevented retaliation would be preferable to one that
merely protected anonymity, because (1) speech consumers would stand to benefit from knowing
the speaker’s identity, and (2) the speaker would stand a better chance of being taken seriously, all
other things being equal. Reality suggests, however, that retaliation (let alone mere social ostracism) can never be prevented with 100% effectiveness, and thus that a rule forbidding anonymity
almost certainly would discourage some apprehensive speakers from coming forward.”).
22. Though it is possible that circumstances will change such that very few persons feel the
need to avail themselves of this kind of protection. My point in the text is that anonymity protects
speech in a distinct way.
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the possibilities of the bad speech that might result.23 For instance, the right
to free speech itself is not dependent on there being a favorable balance of
good speech and bad speech, but rather enjoys a justification that transcends
this balance. This justification is the value of speech in advancing one’s
thinking, which happens through both good and bad speech.
Such are the problems of evaluating anonymity based on a grand accounting of various values, with no definite way to compare them. By contrast, my own view holds that persons must be free to read and speak anonymously not because these rights produce the best results—though they
may—but because they vindicate the central goal of the First Amendment,
which is to ensure a vigorous public sphere.24
Note that my goal is not to mount a full critique of Lidsky and Cotter’s
approach, but only to emphasize that it presumes a particular picture of what
anonymity is and hence how it is justified. Based on their approach, we are
drawn into the project of creating a tradeoff schedule for the various effects
of anonymity because it is assumed that anonymity does not provide its own
normative logic, apart from totaling up its costs and benefits.
Other scholars follow the approach of Lidsky and Cotter.25 For example, Jeffrey Skopek’s comprehensive and innovative article mentions that
anonymity “often hides the identity of someone about whom facts are known
for the purpose of putting such goods into public circulation.”26 This is, in
my opinion, a correct characterization of anonymity that has profound implications. Citizens need anonymity to start communally experimenting with
what they think, but without having to make their experiments known. However, Skopek does not develop this remark as a statement of anonymity’s
normative significance or the key to its justification in particular cases. Instead, he intends it to be a summary of how anonymity—and attribution—
are:
[B]oth used by our law to shape the costs and benefits of creating
goods in order to align private production incentives with public goals
and values, control information flows in order to address evaluation

23. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 8, at 1581 n.190 (“[w]hether the costs and benefits of anonymous speech are even commensurable with respect to one another is debatable. As we suggested
above, for example, if the autonomy interests in support of a right to speak anonymously are worthy
of respect, how exactly does one determine the optimal tradeoff in return for a reduction in harmful
speech? More importantly, and as others before us have noted, the social welfare approach appears
inconsistent with a good deal of existing First Amendment jurisprudence…”).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 36–52.
25. Citations can be multiplied in law and philosophy. E.g., Allison R. Hayward, Bentham &
Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & POL. 39 (2010);
Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Many Masks of Anon: Anonymity as Cultural Practice and Reflections in Case Law, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013) (cataloguing costs and benefits of anonymous
speech); Ponesse, supra note 5, at 304 (noting the two-faced nature of anonymity).
26. Jeffrey Skopek, Anonymity, the Production of Goods, and Institutional Design, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1755 (2014).
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costs associated with using goods, and reallocate rights of control over
goods in order achieve their efficient or fair allocation.27

For Skopek, anonymity is a peculiar or interesting kind of tool or “design lever”28 that institutions can manipulate to get the results they want, and
will be justified when it is the right tool to bring about the desired outcome.29
Crucially though, Skopek explicitly disclaims any attempt to try and
identify what the right outcome would be, such that the use of anonymity
would be the most suitable lever to pull to make it so. From Skopek’s comments about balancing interests it seems plausible that he supposes the right
outcome is a complicated grand accounting of anonymity’s impact on a multitude of goods, rather than the single distinct good of anonymity. Instead,
the grand accounting considers the impact of goods such as efficiency, freedom, and fairness.
The overall point is this that many legal theorists of anonymity treat its
justification as a matter of seeing to what degree it can call forth various
mixtures of good and bad in a given factual context. When it calls forth a
sufficiently attractive mixture in a particular case, it is justified. This view
of how anonymity is justified embodies a contestable assumption; namely,
that we use it to realize goods, whatever they happen to be and as the opportunity arises.
B. Anonymity Has a Distinct Normative Significance All Its Own: It is
an Evasion of Responsibility

In this section, I offer a theory of anonymity that will address two issues: the nature of anonymity and its consequent normative and legal significance. I contend that the nature of anonymity is that of preventing persons
from being held responsible for the things they do with ideas ( e.g., speaking
them and reading them). This aspect of anonymity’s nature—that it is responsibility defeating—is troubling and calls for justification. After all, it is
a matter of general moral importance that persons be held responsible (fairly
and proportionally of course) for those things that they are responsible for.
For example, persons are responsible for how they conduct themselves and
they may be held responsible for how they do so through various means,
such as civil suits for battery and negligence. There are exceptions such that

27. Id. at 1756.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1755 (Skopek at one point says that anonymity is not a “mere tool or aspect of
privacy.” Note that in saying this, he does not intend to deny that anonymity is a tool; rather, he
tries to claim that anonymity is not a tool of privacy, but one of a wider sort. I will argue later that
this is based on a misunderstanding of privacy, as many if not all the examples he cites of anonymity
are cases of privacy when privacy is understood properly as a certain kind of barrier to being held
responsible.).
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conduct that would ordinarily earn liability does not, but these exceptions
are, we say, privileges and require strong justification.30
Since persons are responsible for what they say to others, they should
be potentially held responsible for the same. But anonymity precludes the
latter, and thus constitutes an exception to the ordinary moral order of things.
For this reason, it is a privilege, and requires a strong justification. This
justification is supplied by the proper use of anonymity, which is to allow
persons to participate in thinking with others through externalizing and receiving ideas, without having first to work out which ideas they wish to be
responsible for.
It should be noted that this justification is similar in some ways to what
I believe to be the justification for the privacy of thoughts. Persons are responsible for their thoughts but may not be held responsible for them since
their thinking would suffer under such intense scrutiny. Anonymity plays a
similar role, but for communal rather than personal thinking. That is, anonymity allows a person to interact with the thinking of others, without having
to “own” a particular position to do so. Still, I should stress, anonymity is
not the ideal form of community thinking. The ideal is to think with others
in one’s own name. However, getting to that point requires space in which
to prepare and consolidate. Anonymity (and privacy) provide that space.
1.

The Nature of Anonymity

Having laid out my two main contentions, I will now defend them. First
is the claim that anonymity defeats the ability for others to hold one responsible. If one thinks that holding persons responsible involves imposing consequences on them or doing something to them, then anonymity will often
preclude it, by denying the other party knowledge of the “target” for these
interventions.
However, the activity of holding someone responsible does not necessarily involve imposing consequences on them, although it can progress to
that point. Instead, the essence of holding someone responsible is the making of a mental record that links a particular person with something for which
they are responsible (e.g., an action or a thought). By doing this, one updates
one’s view of the person to reflect how they have changed. Put another way,
holding someone responsible for something adds to one’s mental biography
of that person and so alters, to some extent, one’s view of that person.
A full defense of this view would overwhelm the goals of this article,
but I will provide three examples to show its plausibility. The first is an
institutional example. Congress holds various government entities and officers responsible by exercising “oversight,” which may consist of building
a record of who did what and who is responsible for what, which often takes
30. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 28-34 (surveying some privileges against tort liability, such as the selfdefense and litigation privileges).
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the form of an official report.31 Of course, a report may, depending on its
content, warrant more.32 Perhaps new laws are needed, or charges need to
be brought against wrongdoers. My view does not deny that holding someone responsible may continue well past the stage of record-making; it only
insists that its anchoring, initiating, and indispensable core is one of recordmaking. Although its starting point is the epistemic task of generating an
accurate understanding of what happened, that understanding may legitimate
and even require additional steps. One step might asking “What do you have
to say for yourself?” followed by punishment or liability if the response to
the previous question is not satisfactory.
The second example is interpersonal. In many cases, persons hold each
other responsible without blaming or punishing. Two colleagues may hold
each other responsible for writing a certain amount each week by nothing
more than “checking in.” In a week when both meet their quota, holding
each other responsible need not consist of anything other than an email with
the writing from that week. Even when one party fails to write, nothing more
is warranted.33 Perhaps the other party simply acknowledges their lack of
writing for the week. Similarly, when an ordinarily punctual friend is running late, one may hold them responsible by simply noting that they are late,
without thinking anything of it. If the friend is late again, one is prepared to
say “this is the second time you’ve been late,” which may, in turn, warrant
some digging or a demand for an explanation: “is everything ok?”
While the first two examples are about non-speech action, the lesson
I’m taking from them is further confirmed by the third example: speech. Persons hold each other responsible for what they say by acknowledging that
they have said it. For instance, an audience holds a speaker responsible for
what they heard the speaker say, scholars hold each other responsible for
what they argue by citing their work, and journalists hold politicians responsible by “putting them on the record.” The point is, again, that holding someone responsible is fundamentally a matter of adjusting one’s view of the person by taking account of what that person is responsible for.
Since holding someone responsible is a matter of mentally linking a
particular person with a particular thing for which they are responsible,
providing these two pieces of information asks or invites another party to
perform this bit of recordkeeping. This kind of asking or inviting constitutes
taking responsibility. So, when a speaker states content as theirs—”in their
31. Another example: a school may hold a student responsible by making a note on the student’s permanent record.
32. For instance, a grand jury is a means by which the government tries to figure out what
happened in a way that is sufficiently accurate to warrant further steps (i.e., making the accusation
against the target).
33. A person may tell friends of their New Year’s resolution so that they will be held responsible for meeting them, again, solely by the friends’ registering whether they have met them or not.
Nothing more is needed.
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own name”—the speaker provides, in a single package, everything that a
listener needs to make the corresponding record in the listener’s mind: that
the speaker is responsible for the content. Such provision of all the requisites
for being held responsible invites the listener to go through the required bit
of record-keeping, and hold the speaker responsible. In an ordinary conversation between two people, this kind of exchange is ubiquitous. One person
says that it is a nice day and the listener holds them responsible for saying
so, by hearing and so recording them as saying it.
Through presenting some content as one’s own, one takes responsibility
because it facilitates another person to hold one responsible for one’s content. The flip side of this is that one avoids taking responsibility for some
content by attempting to preclude another’s holding one responsible for it,
by not presenting it as one’s own.
Crucially, there are two ways to not present content as one’s own. One
way is not to present the content at all. If one does not speak one’s thoughts
to another, then one attempts to keep others ignorant of one’s content.
Through this approach, one signals an unwillingness to be held responsible
for the content, and such unwillingness should generally be honored.
This default is, as I mentioned before, a consequence of persons being
entitled to mental privacy.34 Without this entitlement, others could begin to
hold a thinker responsible for their thoughts at an arbitrary point in their development – before they are really finished being worked out. This will misrepresent the thinker’s true position. Moreover, persons who are not ready
to share their thoughts are vulnerable to being excessively influenced by
those who expose their thinking, perhaps conforming to what they perceive
to be the exposer’s viewpoint.
However, a second way to not present content as one’s own, and to
signal an unwillingness to be held responsible for it, is to present the content
but not as one’s own. Anonymity permits this second option. As previously
discussed, holding someone responsible is a matter of attributing something
to someone as theirs: mentally linking a specific person to some specific
content. But without access to that person by way of their name, this is impossible. If holding someone responsible is a matter of recording something
in one’s mental “file” on a person, then without a name, the right file cannot
be updated. For example, if one receives an anonymous note, one can, at
most, make a mental note of the content, and file it under the heading “?” as
a placeholder for whoever sent it.
This theoretical result is bolstered by common intuitions about names.
When something bad happens and we want to hold someone responsible, we
34. I argue for the claims in this paragraph at length in previous writing. See Jordan WallaceWolf, Mental Privacy (2020) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles) (on file with University of California eScholarship, available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0g21n38c).
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may shout “I want names!” Informants are threatening because they might
“name names,” and when we want to praise or criticize someone specifically,
we may “call them out” by name. In all these cases, a name provides the key
for holding someone responsible, because it provides a label, shared among
a community, under which their actions can be recorded, and, if necessary,
judged in various ways.35 A name is the means of mental record-making
about a particular thing, par excellence.36
An example of these claims is art. An artist signing a painting is like a
speaker stating a thought in their own name. The artist’s signature is not just
a piece of evidence that they painted it, on a par with a chemical or
brushstroke analysis that says the same. An artist signing a painting is an
endorsement. It indicates that the artist thinks the painting counts as a full
member of their corpus. Arguably, a signed painting is one they wish to be
known or evaluated by, whereas an unsigned painting is one they disclaim,
as not fully representative of their artistic style. Again, the point is not that
disclaiming a piece of art can make it so—they painted the painting. Nothing
can change that. Rather the point is that any interpretation of their art should
take into account how they view it. It would be a misleading simplification
to treat everything the artist ever painted, even what the artist threw away or
never showed, as equal members of the artist’s corpus.
The discussion so far has addressed the first goal of this section to elaborate on the nature of anonymity: that it is responsibility defeating. Since
holding someone responsible is fundamentally an act of mental recordation—of linking, in thought, a particular act or thought with a particular
person—and since a name is the way one thinks directly about a particular
person, ignorance of person’s name precludes holding them responsible. If
one does not know who wrote a note, its content cannot be attributed to anyone as that for which they are responsible. It is disclaimed content.
It must be emphasized that though namelessness precludes being held
responsible, it is not true that anonymity guarantees namelessness. Not signing a note or a painting may often keep it nameless, but not always and perhaps not forever. The author may be easy to identify despite there being no
signature, or it may come to light later when new information is revealed.
Still, the anonymous speech is a bid or an attempt to avoid being held responsible for content, and this aspect of anonymous speech is inseparable
from the speech itself and survives the identification of its speaker. What I
mean is that if the anonymous author of a note is later identified, it is not as
35. The community is the holder of a person’s “complete” record, in the sense that whatever
others attribute to that person under the person’s name can, in principle, be combined (e.g., “Oh
you know Jim? I was on a trip with him once and he…”). Things are complicated for others with
“secret identities” (e.g., Batman).
36. Cf. Skopek, supra note 5, at 720-22 (arguing that a name is just like any other piece of
information in being a potential way to single the person out such that “namelessness is neither a
sufficient nor a necessary condition for anonymity”).
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if the content of the note can now be considered written in the author’s name
in the same way as their other correspondences.37 A cloud of uncertainty or
ambiguity hangs over the note, even after being linked to its source, because
the linkage has been created post hoc by others and not the author. The note
was never put forward as the author’s, and this fact is not altered by finding
out that they did in fact write it. Instead, its disclaimed status lives on.
Taking into account these last points, my claims about the nature of
anonymity can be put compactly like this: a nameless person cannot be held
fully responsible for the content they put forward, and anonymity always
seeks namelessness, even if it fails to achieve it.
2.

The Value of Anonymity

Having dealt with the nature of anonymity, I turn now to its value.
What is the good in it? Why should persons be allowed to defeat the responsibility for which ideas they traffic with? Why should they have this privilege? My answer is built around thinking.
Persons have an interest in thinking critically, thoroughly, and autonomously, which requires having control over when their solitary thinking becomes a part of thinking with others. This is the basis of privacy in one’s
thoughts. Without this control, persons may be misrepresented or have their
thinking stunted or diverted. With this control, persons can wait until they
are satisfied with their thinking before integrating it with the thinking of others, as the latter requires carrying out a demanding joint activity and fulfilling
its attendant obligations.
Morality recognizes this interest in control by prohibiting others from
accessing the content of thoughts that one has not signaled a readiness to
reveal. This protects one’s ability to withhold content from joint-thinking
and to introduce it to others only selectively, at one’s own pace, and on one’s
own terms. It allows persons to start thinking by themselves and then pull
in mentors, friends, and spiritual advisors before broadening further to, say,
a small workshop and then to a conference, and perhaps eventually, to the
republic of letters in the form of published work.
Protection for growing the breadth of one’s own thinking at one’s own
pace is valuable, but it is also limited in that one sometimes needs access to
others to further develop their thinking. That is, one sometimes prepares to
think with a community in one’s own name by first thinking with the community anonymously. But if one were only protected from being held responsible by others so long as one kept quiet, then one would always have
to take responsibility for the relevant thought in front of an audience to grow
from the community’s input. This is a Catch-22 because in order to think
37. The same is true when an anonymous painting is later identified as the work of a particular
artist. Though the artist painted it, the import of the painting to interpretations and judgments of the
artist’s artistic legacy is ambiguous due to her decision not to treat it as a full member of her corpus.
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with others about something, so as to better assess whether to take responsibility for it, one would first have to take responsibility for it to that very
audience.
These points illustrate the need for protection for one’s thinking that
allows for one’s participation in various community discourses, rather than
withholding one’s thoughts from them. Take thinking with the public at
large. Public thinking is not just private thinking with a lot of people. It is
of a different order. For example, publishing something does not just make
it available to a certain set of persons, but to persons, generally and indiscriminately.38 Consequently, participation in public thinking is distinctly
valuable, both in and of itself and as a means of improving what one thinks.39
However, such participation is also particularly intimidating because it defines who one is, not just in some circles, but to an entire community of
persons. Thus persons need a participatory kind of privacy that will let them
think with others, but without being held responsible for their thoughts by
them.
Anonymity protects one’s thinking in various community discourses
because it prevents persons from being held responsible for their thoughts.
By suppressing their identity and not their ideas, it allows persons who are
unready to be held responsible for their ideas to participate in public discourse, albeit as “nobody.” For this reason, anonymity can be understood as
the public-facing or participatory side of mental privacy. This is its justified
use: to permit persons to engage in community thinking (with the maximal
community being the public) without the burden of having to take responsibility for their thoughts.
3.

The Justification for Anonymous Speaking and Reading

Consider anonymous reading, which, for example, includes anonymously preparing to read, say, by querying a search engine.40 It is a paradigmatic illustration of a privileged use of anonymity. The thinking-based, participatory interests persons have in reading are enormous; the risks posed by
reading in one’s own name are serious, and the possibilities for abusing
anonymous reading are scarce.41
38. Cf. Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 14 PUB. CULTURE 49 (2002) (discussing the formation of a public).
39. In thinking with others, one must articulate ideas in ways that can speak to many kinds of
listeners, and likewise to respond and address arguments from many kinds of challengers or critics.
40. The First Amendment right to read anonymously has not received an explicit endorsement
from the Supreme Court. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (In Stanley, there is
strong support for such a right, since it permitted persons to view obscene material in the privacy
of their home. Justice Marshall conceived of the case in terms of the privacy of the mind and characterized the right at issue as “the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library.”).
41. Others have also argued forcefully that anonymous reading is important. See, e.g., Marc
Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and
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First, the interest in receiving the content of others is crucial to thinking
and without it, the ability to have thoughts without revealing them to others
would be of limited value since one would be restricted to whatever thoughts
one could put together by oneself. One needs material to gain from solitary
thinking. One needs to access the rich legacy of past thinking in the form of
“great” books but also to get in touch with the zeitgeist, which may live in
pulp novels or popular TV. Seeing what others are thinking is a way of participating in community thinking at a basic level.
These benefits are threatened if one must read in one’s own name, because what one reads is an infirm but tempting basis for others to reach conclusions about who one is. Consider two examples, one old and one new. In
the late 80s, a reporter gathered Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s video
rental records from his local store.42 Nothing too shocking was revealed, but
still, this prematurely exposed the workings of Bork’s mind. More recently,
the New York Times ran an article that analyzed celebrity bookshelves (made
visible due to zoom calls prompted by the coronavirus pandemic) in an effort
to see what they “revealed” about them.43 Here too, the content a person
engages with excites speculation about who they are and what they think.
Reading on the subway also demonstrates the dynamics of judgment at play
in such knowledge.44 One may be circumspect about reading notorious
works. No doubt, what one reads reflects what one thinks, but only inchoately because reading is how one explores an area, or satisfies curiosity, in
preparation for settling on what one truly believes. Search queries are an
even earlier stage of one’s curiosity, in which one decides what to read.
Moreover, it is often the most “radical” material that is crucial to developing one’s own views, because they help one chart the boundary of what is
ambitious and extreme and what is nonsense or patently mistaken.45 It is a
a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L.
REV. 799 (2004); Marc Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual Reality,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141 (2008); Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at
“Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Neil Richards, The Perils
of Social Reading, 101 GEORGETOWN L. REV. 689 (2013).
42. Andrea Peterson, How Washington’s Last Remaining Video Rental Store Changed the
Course of Privacy Law, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/04/28/how-washingtons-last-remaining-video-rental-store-changed-the-courseof-privacy-law/.
43. Gal Beckerman, What Do Famous People’s Bookshelves Reveal?, N. Y. TIMES (July 27,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/books/celebrity-bookshelves-tv-coronavirus.html.
44. Susan Dominus, Snoopers on Subway, Beware Digital Books, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/nyregion/31bigcity.html (discussing privacy in what persons read in public); Scott Rogowsky, Taking Fake Book Covers on the Subway, YOUTUBE (Apr.
6, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jFxu9dOO4zk&feature=youtu.be (humorously
dramatizing the privacy aspect of reading on public transportation by conspicuously reading fake
books with outlandish titles).
45. It is a separate issue, but one worth mentioning, that anonymity is, in this regard, also
crucial for those propounding minority viewpoints, because if the latter cannot even be considered
without incurring social judgment, then they will be robbed of their persuasive merit before any
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sensitive affair because in reading, even when one is reading mainstream
ideas, one plays host to another mind and gives oneself over to its narrative
of the relevant issues and ideas, or, in a novel, to its plot and characters.46 In
reading an author’s work, one becomes their associate or fellow traveler for
a time, and the risk of “guilt by association” is great. This is similar to the
way that actual association with an organization or a person may be tainting,
even though one’s associates hardly define one’s own viewpoint.47 A prominent example is reading communist literature during the fifties and sixties.48
Going much further back, we can take account of the decisive change in society that resulted from the slow introduction of silent reading starting in the
16th century.49 Reading something without others knowing what it was “radically transformed intellectual work.”50
Anonymous reading can be abused. It can be abused to infringe copyright,51 learn information for malevolent purposes,52 or serve as the audience
for wrongful revelations about others, such as by reading a tabloid article
that one would ordinarily be ashamed to be seen reading. These consequences may be managed in other ways though.53 There are ways to protect
copyright besides trying to reveal the identity of those who read anonymously or by blocking anonymous access. Gaining information about how
to break the law does not entail a desire or ability to do so much more than
any non-mental step in doing so. There is ample time to intercept criminal
activity without trying to monitor what people are wondering about. The
same is arguably true about anonymous access to privacy-invading content,
as those who post such information may be better targets for identification.
Anonymous speech is also justified, though its abuse may directly constitute a violation of a non-property law, such as in the case of anonymous
defamation or the interference with the thinking of others through the spread

discussion takes place. See Margot Kaminski and Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First
Amendment Implications of Surveillance Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 508
(2015) (making this point).
46. CECILE JAGODZINSKI, PRIVACY AND PRINT (1999) (discussing religious authorities’ worries about the effect of reading on devotees); Georges Poulet, Phenomenology of Reading, 1 NEW
LITERARY HISTORY 53 (1969).
47. NAACP v. Alabama Ex Rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
48. E.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (The First Amendment bars the
requirement to certify that one is not a communist).
49. 3 Roger Chartier, The Practical Impact of Writing, in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE 124
(Roger Chartier ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1989).
50. Id. at 125.
51. See Cohen, supra note 41.
52. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005) (many of
the possible benefits of such speech redound to readers of it, some of whom, perhaps most, will be
anonymous).
53. Cf. Blitz, supra note 41, at 1171 (“a silent listener threatens less disruption to the lives of
others than does a public speaker”).
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of false information.54 Nonetheless, speaking anonymously is an important
channel for participating in public reasoning. It allows one to make an idea
a part of public discourse. It also allows persons to test out ideas by soliciting
responses indiscriminately from others and, in turn, to identify those who are
interested and knowledgeable. These justifications for anonymous speech
do not depend on the need to resist or obviate the wrongful conduct of others.
In other cases, though, one may need anonymous speech to (partially)
counter the wrongs of others. For instance, someone with an unpopular
viewpoint may be perfectly satisfied with it but wish to speak it anonymously
for fear that they will unfairly suffer for it, whether due to reprisals, or else
due to being stereotyped by others. A whistleblower may be confident that
wrongdoing has occurred, but still resist speaking without anonymity, due to
the risk of reprisals. A member of a radical political party, on the other hand,
may be worried about being misrepresented or demonized. The Supreme
Court has paid special attention to the interests of political speakers in remaining anonymous, arguing, in an important precedent, that “identification
of the author against her will is particularly intrusive; it reveals unmistakably
the content of her thoughts on a controversial issue.”55
In other cases, one does not wish to take responsibility for an idea not
because one is uncertain of it nor because one will suffer for it, but rather
because one wants the idea to be fairly received and appreciated for the true
value it has. An example is art. A novelist may be satisfied with their novel
and satisfied that they can publish it without suffering any reprisals. Nonetheless, the artist may suspect that because she is a woman, their novel will
be poorly received. This mis-reception is an indirect misrepresentation of
them since the neglect of their novel will reflect badly on them as a novelist.
It may also be injurious to them directly, as the neglect of their art itself,
which they are invested in.
To avoid these responses, they may publish under a pseudonym or
anonymously. In this example, the author is subject to wrongful prejudice,
but in other cases, the prejudice may not be wrongful, at least not in the same
way. For instance, J.K. Rowling published under a pseudonym to receive
more honest feedback from editors, and many presidents have done the
same.56 Here, the goal is not to avoid prejudice but to avoid superficial

54. Jason A. Martin & Anthony L. Fargo, Anonymity as a Legal Right: Where and Why It
Matters, 16 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 311, 340-343 (2015) (citing a number of examples).
55. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995) (“identification of the
author against her will is particularly intrusive; it reveals unmistakably the content of her thoughts
on a controversial issue.”); See also, Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (anonymous political
pamphleting); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (petition circulators could not be made to wear name tags); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of NY, Inc. v.
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002) (door to door religious solicitation).
56. Sylvia Hui, J.K. Rowling Revealed as Writer of Crime Novel, WASH. POST (July 14,
2013), https://wapo.st/2UEpxBm.
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praise, earned only by their reputation rather than their ideas. Publius is another famous example from American history. Though it is a pseudonym, it
wears its pseudonymity on its sleeve, rather than purporting to be the true
name of someone.
Speaking anonymously can be abused. This is because anonymity is a
departure from the norm, and the reason for the departure cannot often be
easily discerned without the aid of background conventions or institutions.
Consequently, some anonymous statements, if they are false, abusive, or
originate in tentativeness on the speaker’s part, may not be communicated.
This is because others may take the anonymity as a sign that what is being
said is true, but told anonymously because it is threatening to someone in
power. An example is an anonymous tell-all book from an “insider” in a
presidential administration.57 In such case, readers will infer that anonymity
is being used to avoid wrongful reprisals, which provides cover for someone
to spread disinformation more easily. Denials of the falsehoods may fan the
flames too since they may appear to be evidence of a cover up and proof of
the damaging nature of the revealed secrets. In other cases, such as the anonymous posting of non-consensual pornography, anonymity is nothing but an
attempt to avoid being held responsible.
It is important to see the significance of these abuses. A legal right to
speak anonymously may incidentally shield, to a degree, abuses of that right
given that the proper use of the right is responsibility defeating. Due process
may require additional steps to hold a person responsible for anonymous defamation simply because, without such steps, the legitimate value of anonymity would be undermined. However, I think there is little doubt that using
anonymity simply to escape being held responsible for wrongdoing is an
abuse of it. If so, this is further evidence that anonymity’s justifiability turns
on its nature and not on its consequences. Anonymous speech that is otherwise illegal should not be evaluated on a cost-benefit basis, with some credit
being given to it simply because it is a way of organizing one’s message.
The anonymity in such a case is no different than waiting until dark to commit a crime with the goal of escaping detection for a wrongful act.
For the above reasons, persons have a strong interest in being able to
interact anonymously with communal thinking, which is comprised of anonymous speaking and reading. These two kinds of interactions with the republic of letters—the public understood as the community of readers and
57. E.g., ANONYMOUS, A WARNING (2019) (insider look at the Trump White House). The
author of A Warning was later revealed to be Miles Taylor, who defended his anonymity in terms
of the impact he intended his book to have on public discourse. See Katherine Faulders, ‘Anonymous,’ Author of White House Tell-All Book, Revealed to be Miles Taylor, ABC NEWS (Oct. 28,
2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/anonymous-author-white-house-book-revealed-miles-taylor/story?id=73884296 (“Issuing my critiques without attribution forced the President to answer
them directly on their merits or not at all, rather than creating distractions through petty insults and
name-calling. I wanted the attention to be on the arguments themselves”).
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writers—are legally protected by the U.S. constitutional system in the form
of the First Amendment. In the next section, I explore whether and to what
degree persons have any interests in interacting anonymously with the republic itself—the public understood as a constitutional order.

III. Applications of the Theory – Voting and Charitable
Giving
Should democracy always be practiced in the open? To investigate this
question, consider: voting by citizens,58 voting by legislative representatives,59 and signing a ballot initiative.60 The issue at the heart of these practices is: the degree of political power that must be exercised openly, and the
determining factors that bear on the answer to that question in a particular
case. A more focused version of this question is: what is the nature of a
citizen’s interest in voting anonymously? Is the secret ballot for citizens a
pragmatic attempt to prevent corruption and intimidation or is it a more fundamental interest, akin to the right to speak anonymously or the right to participate in politics?
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed this question, but it
came close in Doe v. Reed, in which it considered a ballot initiative to repeal
a recently passed Oregon law altering the rights of domestic partners, including same-sex partners.61 According to state law, the signatories to the ballot
initiative and their addresses were public record and could be requested by
private parties under a state transparency statute.62 The law was facially
challenged as a violation of First Amendment in virtue of requiring the disclosure of a persons’ political affiliations. The decision was 8-1 in favor of
the holding that a state’s choice to make ballot initiative signatories publicly
available was permissible under the First Amendment. However, the Court
58. See Levmore, supra note 10, at 2219-2220 (pointing out the prevalence of secret balloting
in national elections). An exception is West Virginia. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-4 (West) (“In
all elections the mode of voting shall be by ballot, but the voter shall be left free to vote by either
open, sealed, or secret ballot, as he may elect”).
59. Some theorists have wondered why elected representatives must vote publicly. See
Levmore, supra note 10, at 2219-2220 (“[a]nonymity is thus required rather than simply accepted
in (the legal rules governing) general elections. In contrast, when voting takes place in representative or deliberative bodies, it is open.”); Annabelle Lever, Privacy and Democracy: What the Secret
Ballot Reveals, 11 LAW, CULTURE, AND THE HUMAN. 164, 175 (2015) (“[w]hile democratic legislators may be more vulnerable to intimidation than citizens – as they are relatively few in number
and hold special power and authority qua legislators – it is the former, not the latter, who must vote
openly, not secretly”).
60. See Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (Oregon ballot initiative); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional
Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (analyzing Colorado ballot initiative rules).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 190 (The Washington Public Records Act (PRA) authorizes private parties to obtain
copies of government documents, and the State construes the PRA to cover submitted referendum
petitions.).
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emphasized that the challengers to the law could prevent disclosure if they
could show a specific risk of reprisals or harassment from publication.63 Although the constitutional status of the secret balloting was not discussed, three
broad views about that practice can be extracted from the opinions.
One view, embodied in Justice Thomas’ dissent, views “privacy in political association”64 as is sufficiently important to warrant anonymity. In his
view, state law may not require that ballot initiative signatories be made public because it chills the exercise of First Amendment electoral rights.65 Given
the privacy justification Justice Thomas offers for this claim, it seems clear
that he would support the secret ballot as earning significant constitutional
support.
Justice Scalia takes the opposite view in his concurrence, concluding
that the secret ballot enjoys no fundamental constitutional or democratic justification.66 He argues first by invoking the history of electoral practices in
the U.S.67 But he also contends that acts that have a legislative effect must
be public. He writes that the “public nature of federal lawmaking is constitutionally required,” and he clearly intends this constitutional judgment to
encompass state lawmaking too.68
This principle disposes of the case given his opinion that, by signing a
ballot initiative, a signatory is “acting as a legislator.”69 This principle is
broad though, and also arguably entails that there is no First Amendment
right, or fundamental democratic interest, in voting anonymously—something that Chief Justice Roberts correctly points out in a footnote.70 Justice
Scalia’s view can be characterized as favoring consistent publicity; when
legislators vote, when citizens vote as something akin to legislators, and
when citizens vote. This view puts him in the company of many political
scientists and theorists, who argue that, prima facie, voting by citizens should

63. As a matter of law, the Court is correct to keep open the possibility that in particular instances in which a policy such as the PRA burdens expression “by the public enmity attending
publicity,” speakers may have a winning constitutional claim. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982); Id. at 218 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 204-06
(Alito, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 231 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (We have acknowledged the existence
of a First Amendment interest in voting, but we have never said that it includes the right to vote
anonymously. The history of voting in the United States completely undermines that claim.); Id. at
224 (Scalia J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 221 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our Nation’s longstanding traditions of legislating and
voting in public refute the claim that the First Amendment accords a right to anonymity in the
performance of an act with governmental effect.”).
68. Id. at 222 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 221 (Scalia J., concurring).
70. Id. at 196 n.1.
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be public, but that sometimes the dangers of voter corruption or voter intimidation warrant secret balloting as a prophylactic counter.71
All the other justices gravitate toward either Justice Scalia’s or Justice
Thomas’ position about the fundamentals of the case—about whether the
right starting point is privacy of political belief or the publicity of electoral
activity—but find reason to moderate it for pragmatic reasons, from either
direction. For instance, Justice Roberts essentially endorses Justice Thomas’
view that anonymous political participation is a fundamental First Amendment right but, unlike Thomas, he sees the government interests in protecting
against fraud and mistakes as enough to justify publicity despite that right.
For Justice Roberts, ballot initiatives implicate a fundamental privacy interest, but that interest may be qualified when the pragmatics of the situation
demand it.72
Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Stevens, on the other hand, approach the case more from Scalia’s view, favorably quoting about the publicity of lawmaking and broadly lauding the importance of “openness” and
“transparency” as well as the “inherently public” nature of ballot initiatives.
However, it is unclear how Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Stevens’ position exactly relates to Justice Scalia. On the one hand, they do not only
rest their opinion on the public nature of legislating, but also that pragmatic
interests permit the regulation of elections by states. They further argue that
any free speech interest in anonymous political association is only minimally
implicated by disclosure of the ballot initiative signatories. On the other
hand, they argue this last point by analogy to campaign finance disclosure
rules. They say these rules “do not prevent anyone from speaking,” but public voting would not prevent anyone from speaking (or voting) either.73 If
this latter argument about the negligible effects of disclosure is given emphasis, then their position is closer to Scalia’s in favor of thoroughgoing publicity. If the pragmatic rationales are more important, then it seems that they
are closer to Justice Roberts in believing that there is a privacy interest in
political association that can be curtailed for pragmatic reasons.
The key lesson from Doe is its dialectic. The two principles that divide
the justices are blunt and eliminate the intermediate moral terrain, with only
71. Most famously, John Stuart Mill. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT Ch. X (1873) (available at https://www.google.com/books/edition/Considerations_on_Representative_Governm/16FFAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0). Contemporary examples are Daniel Sturgis, Is Voting a Private Matter?, 36 J. OF SOC. PHIL. 18 (2005);
Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan, Unveiling the Vote, 20 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCIENCE 311 (1990);
Pierre-Etienne Vandamme, Voting Secrecy and the Right to Justification, 25 CONSTELLATIONS 388
(2017) (arguing that balloting itself should be secretive, but persons should have to give their justifications for voting as they did). See generally Tom Theuns, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill
and the Secret Ballot: Insights from Nineteenth Century Democratic Theory, 63 AUSTRALIAN J. OF
POL. & HIST. 493 (2017) (offering a synoptic, historically informed view of the issue).
72. Reed, 561 U.S. at 197-99.
73. Id. at 196.
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pragmatic concerns tempering their reach. Political beliefs are either private
or else voting must be public. I suspect the bluntness owes to the fact that
both principles are likely to be the partial consequences of deeper, more tangled moral principles. This is evidenced by the fact that it seems coherent to
ask why lawmaking should be public, and why a person’s political beliefs
may be subject to privacy protections. If we knew the answers to these questions, we might be able to see how there is room for distinctions between
democratic practices that do not amount to pragmatic limitations on a single,
broad principle. There may be a fundamental interest in some anonymous
electoral action and a fundamental need for public lawmaking.
The basis for this claim is a view of democracy as a means of securing
an increasingly robust and public deliberation about community issues. For
instance, deliberation about an issue may start in the minds of a few citizens,
but then grow to include dinner-table discussion, water-cooler talk, sermons,
party caucusing, and finally, legislative debate in Congress. In this progression, the earlier stages are more private, while the latter stages are more public. The precise nature of each stage of deliberation turns on the issue itself
and the institutions charged with addressing it.
For example, the grand jury is an institutionalized way for a group of
citizens to consider a particular question: whether the person under investigation committed illegal wrongdoing. If the grand jury finds that the prosecution has not presented sufficient probable cause of the defendant’s wrongdoing, a new grand jury can be convened at a later date to investigate the
same conduct.74 However, if the grand jury does find that there is sufficient
probable cause, the grand jury will issue a true bill and the prosecution of the
defendant continues in the form of an indictment, and a public trial.
Fundamentally, the grand jury is a preparatory, preliminary step in an
overall stretch of deliberation about whether the prosecution has presented
sufficient probable cause of the defendant’s criminal wrongdoing, and is entitled to secrecy to protect jurors from outside pressures.75 The grand jury is
necessary because it is a chance for the government, in partnership with individual citizens, to explore the evidence and get a handle on what happened.76 These activities are exploratory rehearsals of the deliberation that
may take place publicly at trial. Grand juries provide a preview of how a

74. CHARLES DOYLE, THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY, 46 (2008) (discussing the possibility of
convening subsequent grand juries).
75. See 2 Fed. Grand Jury § 16:2 (2d ed.) (principle of secrecy including anonymity); United
States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 649 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing when an anonymous jury can be
empaneled).
76. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 703, 748 (2008) (“[s]ecrecy also shields the grand jury’s exercise of discretion from public
glare, thereby minimizing the possibility that grand jury members will feel compelled to base their
decisions on concerns about immediate public backlash in a given case. Thus, secrecy can lead to
greater reflection and richer, more sincere deliberation”).
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trial might go, and whether the government’s case would be sufficiently convincing in that eventuality. Grand juries are a crucial step in building a case.
Without a grand jury’s approval, any charges would be maverick. It is only
by consulting with and convincing the grand jury as a representative of “the
people” that a prosecutor can bring federal charges in the name of the latter
(e.g., “the people” v. X).
The point of this example is to show that the identifiability or anonymity of citizens in the performance of democratic obligations depends on the
justifications for those obligations and the institutional setting in which they
must be performed. In a federal criminal trial, the public is present in different roles. The prosecutor represents the people by acting on their indictment,
the judge represents the people by being selected by them (usually through
their representatives) and the petit jury represents the people by being a fair
cross-section of them.77 These different roles come together to produce a
display of public reason. This amounts to the accumulated effect of different
persons thinking about a subject matter from different angles, organized in a
productive way, embodied in the detailed procedural rules governing an
open, adversarial trial.
While legislative action differs from determinations of individual criminal guilt, both warrant the same private (or secret) exploratory deliberations
to bolster and prepare for progressively more public deliberations. Whereas
a grand jury is the first step in a stretch of deliberation to proceed with a
public trial, punctuated with a verdict, individual thinking and private conversations between friends are the first step in a stretch of deliberation that
will terminate in congressional debate, punctuated by official state action.
Next, I will identify specific democratic practices and the way in which
they are initiated with private thinking, and how this private thinking is
properly “grown” or “built” into a display of public reason.
A. Representatives Must Vote Publicly

I will start with a view of representative democracy according to which
it is primarily concerned with, and partially justified by, the creation of public persons. Celebrities are public persons, but they are so de facto. By contrast, a representative democracy creates public person de jure, for the purpose of executing and implementing public business.78 The crucial role that
representatives play is not that they make decisions with binding legal effect,
though of course this is important. Rather, the valuable role that public

77. A petit jury is, in some ways, a grand jury that must pronounce publicly, where this obligation of publicity is justified owing to the more determinate question it is asked to answer, and by
the more rigorous controls, in the form of the rules of evidence, of how it is to answer it.
78. The idea is that law creates public persons in the sense that they are public servants with
duties and obligations commensurate with that role. Celebrities are public persons not by the choice
of the community, rather because they happen to be popular or influential.
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persons play is one that is indispensably played by persons, which is to take
responsibility for thinking. Representatives take responsibility for public
thinking in the specific sense that they heighten and develop it, by combining
the disparate viewpoints of their constituents into what is ideally, a coherent,
reasoned, and accessible vision of the political landscape.79
Though I will not defend a full theory, I challenge the view that representatives are just the agents of the people who may not do more than carry
out instructions. The relationship between the people and their representatives is more reciprocal and open-ended, with representatives taking account
of what their constituents think but also reflecting their views back to them.
A simple example might be John McCain telling a town hall participant that
Obama was not an “Arab.” I do not mean to suggest that McCain’s response
was flawless, but only that it illustrates the way in which information flows
in two directions between constituents and those they elect.80
To elaborate on the question answering function of democratic actions,
I will discuss how elected officials are representatives of the public in the
orchestrated bit of public thinking that consists, at least, in legislating: making speeches and voting in Congress. In other capacities, the role of the legislator is different, but still derived from this public function. For instance,
legislators may have meetings with constituents or lobbyists. Such meetings
are not themselves legislating but are also not private in the way that a legislator may have a friend over for dinner. The lobbying may be rightly subject to duties of, for example, disclosure given that it is thinking that is pursuant to legislating.81
In voting for a representative, which I consider next, citizens answer a
question about who would advance the public good, and then the elected
representative continues the citizens’ thinking about that question, by organizing them within their own thinking for use in a public deliberation. This
use makes the citizens derivatively present as participants in that deliberation
too.82 Crucially, a representative can only make the thinking of citizens present to the national deliberation, and vice versa, by carrying out the deliberation publicly. Without publicity, the thinking of constituents reach dead79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (“[t]he effect
of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice,
pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose”).
80. ASSOCIATED PRESS, McCain Counters Obama ‘Arab’ Question, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11,
2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrnRU3ocIH4.
81. Thanks to Seana Shiffrin and Richard Re for asking about the dividing line between a
representative as a public figure and as a private citizen.
82. HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 63, 92 (1967) (discussing the idea of
presence as an influence on views about representation).
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ends, as they have no way of keeping up with the actions of their representatives and the interactive loop between representative and constituents
closes.83
In short, without publicity, citizens cannot hold representatives responsible for public thinking. For this reason, representatives may not vote anonymously, and the reason is not that permitting it would do more harm than
good (though that’s true), but because doing so would be an abuse of anonymity. The purpose of representatives is to take responsibility for public
thinking and on behalf of the public. Consequently, voting anonymously
would directly contravene their public purpose. In other words, the duties of
a legislator preclude the privilege of anonymity.
B. Citizens Have a Non-Pragmatic Interest in Voting Anonymously

In this section, I argue that the secret ballot is favored for two distinct
reasons, neither of which is pragmatic, in the sense of trying to forestall anticipated wrongdoing. Then, I consider the importance of these reasons and
argue, tentatively, that persons should be permitted to vote anonymously despite admittedly serious counter-considerations. The first reason I offer is
one based in the interest of individual citizens. They will often be, with good
reason, unready to take responsibility for their view of the public good, and
yet, they have an interest in providing it to the public. The second reason is
a collective interest that citizens have in not holding each other responsible
for how they vote, to keep citizens from developing an excessively partisan
identity.
The first reason for anonymous voting draws directly from the previously discussed justifications for anonymity; namely, participation in public
thinking. In the case of anonymous speech, one is participating in the public
sphere, but in the case of anonymous voting, one is participating in the government itself. With the former, one chooses the content one will speak or
read. However, when citizens vote, the content is fixed. A citizen is asked
a specific question, for example, should this law be implemented or not, or
which of the following persons should hold office?
Second, the effect is different. Participation in the public sphere does
not exercise power over others in the same way as voting. The latter has
legal effects, whereas the former, while by no means innocuous, has effects
on what others consider or think about. Moreover, some ways of abusing
anonymous speech are illegal because the spoken content is independently
wrongful. For instance, defamatory speech is illegal and so anonymous defamatory speech is too and may be unmasked on that basis. Whereas the use
83. Similar arguments can be made against judicial decisions in which the votes of particular
justices are shielded from public view, such as with the so-called “shadow docket.” See Jimmy
Hoover, Wary Lawmakers Put Justices’ ‘Shadow Docket’ In Spotlight, LAW360 (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://bit.ly/3k2wwjQ.
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of anonymity to vote for damaging or self-serving policies is not, because
persons are free to vote as they choose.
Third, I assume the subject matter of voting is different and specialized
as it pertains to the public good.84 That is, when one is answering a specific
question in voting – the relevant metric in evaluating it is the public good.
This assumption is controversial, but the controversy is innocuous here because it only makes my argumentative task harder. To the extent persons
should vote to maintain a private view of the good then secret balloting will
be even more justified.85
Given these points, we can see that open voting would require something fairly onerous of citizens: it would ask them to publicly answer a difficult question that they may not have settled to their satisfaction and that
they wish to think more about. The difficulty of the question is due to it
being about the public good, which is notoriously difficult to discern. It is
also intimidating because the lives of others are at stake. Moreover, voting
requires applying one’s theory of political morality and communal good to
the specific empirical circumstances one finds oneself in. One must know a
fair bit about one’s society and its conditions to understand what would move
it closer to an ideal, flourishing, or fair society. These conditions are always
changing.
Furthermore, there may be strategic questions to consider that arise
from the way in which institutions aggregate votes, or how representatives
will form coalitions or otherwise amass the needed political power. These
present additional complications and are always changing as well. Thus, the
question of who or what to vote for is one that persons may not easily answer,
warranting continued thought.
By itself, the difficulty of who and what to vote for does not warrant
anonymity for voting as one can simply decide not to answer. However, the
option of answering may not be viable, either because there is pressure to
respond or because exercising it will itself reveal one’s thinking (refusing to
answer some questions tends to reveal a certain answer to them) . Sometimes, there is reasonable pressure to provide an answer. In law school, one
may be asked a difficult legal question and one may wish to think more about
it, but the question comes with some pressure to answer. There are the social
dynamics of being asked something in front of a group of one’s peers, the
need to evaluate students, and the need to elicit material for discussion and
further contemplation as a group.

84. Cf. Annabelle Lever, Mill and the Secret Ballot: Beyond Coercion and Corruption, 19
UTILITAS 354, 369-70 (2007) (arguing for some caveats to the view that voting should be in the
public interest).
85. Then again, a counterargument might be that if persons are supposed to vote based on
their private view of the good, they may arrive at the answer more readily and be expected to make
it public, without invading their entitlement to keep thinking–as further thinking is unnecessary.
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Public voting, it might seem, asks difficult questions to the electorate,
but not with any real pressure since persons can choose not to vote or to
return an empty ballot. This result is arguably beneficial. According to
some, the whole point of public voting is to make persons pay more attention
to how they are voting and so, to defer voting until they are confident enough
to take responsibility for their judgment.
However, I contend there is pressure to answer. Why? Because the
vote of each person cannot wait. In a democracy, everyone’s equal participation is a great public good. If some feel comfortable voting their view of
the public good while others wait to think more, then the former have, for
the arbitrary reason that their thinking “finishes” first, an outsized presence
and role in the formation of public life. Thus, the public loses out when
persons don’t vote because the opportunity to educate and engage that person
about civic affairs is deferred, and the opportunity to be educated by them is
sacrificed as well.
These problems are bad enough as they are, but they are exacerbated by
the fact that there are path dependencies in the life of a polity. Making some
decisions at one point may apply pressure, both rational and non-rational, to
adopt other decisions later, so that not voting early may shut one out of fully
participating in national life, given the later influence that the early votes
have. For example, a decision at one time to pave park paths with gravel
may provide some hindrance to later attempts to encourage bicycle use, since
repaving the paths with smooth concrete may be prohibitively expensive.86
Alternatively, decisions at one point may create new uncertainties, such that
some voters may feel that they must resolve their uncertainties before they
vote. The more cautious voters may be continuously playing catch-up as the
world moves around them. A third related example is that the state of the
polity (its institutions and patterns of interactions) may tend to normalize or
make salient certain kinds of conduct that dampen criticism or dissent. If
persons wait to think more about how society ought to be, they may have to
resist these kinds of pressures.
It is true that those who are cautious about voting may realize that they
must vote their best guess or be left out of national affairs, but this is not a
good kind of pressure to apply. It frames the decision of whether to vote as
one that is partly forced by the thinking of others and may breed resentment.
A better solution is secret balloting, as this permits persons to vote their
best guess, allowing persons to participate in politics right away. Accordingly, persons would not be forced to choose between participating in politics and continuing to think without taking responsibility for it. If this solution is warranted for significant groups of citizens, then there is a reason to
make secret balloting the default for all citizens. If persons had to request to
86. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111
YALE L.J. 1665, 1687 (2002) (giving this example).
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vote anonymously, then they would be trading one undesirable public stance
for another. Requesting anonymity for oneself specifically would allow one
to vote one’s uncertain view of the public good, but one would then have to
accept the suspicion of others that one has something to hide.
At this point, I will review the argument and distinguish it from the
prevalent view that secret balloting guards against voters being bribed or intimidated into changing their vote. In review, the argument is that elections,
which have to be reasonably frequent, pose a hard question to voters. If
voting is public, they must choose between participation or taking responsibility for a political view. If it is anonymous, they need not choose.
This view is a further application of my claim that a key use of anonymity (as namelessness, not non-identifiability) is to permit participation in
communal thinking. The right to speak anonymously, which is, doctrinally,
given special protection in the context of political speech, is a way in which
one can participate in the republic of letters even when one’s thinking is uncertain. Similarly, voting anonymously is how one participates in the republic itself, when one’s thinking about the public good is uncertain. Anonymous reading does double duty. It is not just how one receives information
from the republic of letters, but also from the republic. The former allows
one to enrich one’s thinking about a number of topics, whereas the latter
allows the same, but where the topic is distinct from civic understanding or
engagement.
This view differs from many justifications for the secret ballot.87 Many
theorists think the reason for the secret ballot is to guard against wrongful
attempts to influence voters. According to this view, persons should not have
to vote publicly, because one effect of doing this will be to give an opening
to those bad actors who wish to corrupt or intimidate voters. Bad actors will
be able to see how persons vote, and thus can credibly promise to pay for
votes that they want cast or else issue threats against votes they don’t want
cast. So, the reasoning goes, to preclude these wrongful activities, secret
balloting should be the norm.
By contrast, the rationale I am offering does not put the possibility of
bad actors at the center of the case for the secret ballot. Rather, my view is
that persons cannot be made to think with each other about politics because
that subject matter is hard. Thus, persons will very often not be finished
thinking about it in time for the next election, and yet, their provisional political conclusions are needed. For this reason, the secret ballot is not a capitulation to a flawed and ugly world, but rather responds to a fundamental
87. An exception is Annabelle Lever. She argues that anonymity is not an attempt to head off
bad behavior, but, like me, a way of ensuring participation in government by citizens. Lever’s argument is very different from mine though. She does not discuss anonymity’s relationship to being
responsible for thoughts and instead focuses on the risks of persons being shamed for how they
vote if voting were open. Anonymity prevents this shaming on this view. Her argument is developed across two articles. See Lever, supra note 84; Lever, supra note 59.
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feature of thinking about the public good as it finds expression in democratic
politics. This is a better position than the alternative because it correctly
explains the feeling that the importance of the secret ballot outstrips its
prophylactic benefits. This is especially the case given that those benefits
could likely be gained in other ways (e.g., aggressive investigation and enforcement of laws against voter intimidation and vote-buying).
I have shown how a distinct justification for the secret ballot emerges
from an application of anonymity’s chief rationale, that of being a privilege
to participate in communal thought. As another form of that same privilege,
the secret ballot has significant similarities to anonymous speaking and reading. However, it is also dissimilar to these activities in that it has a collective
dimension. I now shift my focus to an interest in anonymous voting that the
community-at-large has rather than individual citizens. This interest is that
of making salient the creation of “the people” as a collective subject of democratic politics.
The general source of anonymity’s role in creating collectivities is the
import of its removal of an individual’s identity, which can function differently depending on the background conditions. If an individual decides to
make an anonymous statement, the statement has no owner. However, if an
individual with several identities makes an anonymous statement, then the
removal of the individual’s identity may make room for a different one to
take its place, or to enter salience. For my purposes, the kind of substitution
that is most relevant is that of an institutional, collective identity rushing into
the void left by a particular person’s anonymity.88 In these cases, a refusal
to possess something as one’s own is converted, via an institutional background, into a willingness to share responsibility with others.
A concrete example of this general phenomena is the Economist’s editorial policy of not listing the authors of the articles it contains.89 The purpose of this policy is to allow “many writers to speak with a collective
voice.”90 A writer who produces an article does not take responsibility for
their words, primarily, as I, but as a member of a community. I say “primarily” to highlight an important wrinkle, which is that one can, for some articles, find out who wrote it without much trouble because the Economist’s
website lists, at least, its major columnists.91
A second example is per curiam opinions. The practice is complicated
and can have a range of forms and consequences.92 However, its effect is at
88. See Ponesse, supra note 5, at 307.
89. Why Are The Economist’s Writers Anonymous?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 27, 2017), https://medium.economist.com/why-are-the-economists-writers-anonymous-8f573745631d.
90. Id.
91. Editorial Directory, https://mediadirectory.economist.com/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
92. E.g., Stephen L. Wasby, The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76
JUDICATURE 29 (1992); Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at an
Old Colleague, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 46 (1995).
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least sometimes to alter the structure of the resulting opinion. In many cases
in the U.S., judges write for themselves, and the result is a composite of discrete viewpoints on the relevant legal questions where the nature of the composite can be a matter of some complexity.93 These opinions are “by the
court,” but only derivatively. In some situations, the court’s disposition of
the case is not found by combining individual opinions, but rather, is presented fully formed and, so to speak, needing no assembly, in the name of
the court itself. The institution itself speaks.
If we turn back to voting, we can see, with some differences, a similar
paradigm at work: of individual identity effacement as tending to reinforce
the salience and reality of a collective identity. When an election is held, the
people speak and the representatives become credentialed through that
speech.94 In this way, the people serve as the “mind” of the polity. It embodies the shifting, tentative, and flexible view of the nation as it becomes
expressed by the people who speak in elections, and so casts their views in
the form the government, with specific persons occupying its offices.
Anonymity for individual voters preserves the flexibility of the people
and their openness to new arguments, whereas when persons are publicly
identified with their vote, the people become fragmented into particular peoples with particular views. This causes two kinds of inertia that get in the
way of the people serving as a responsive addressee for democratic argument.
One is at the level of individuals becoming associated with a decision.
If voters are publicly associated with their vote, they will develop a record,
and records can create inertia in thinking.95 Persons may be pushed to vote
again for the candidate that they voted for last time, or the policy they endorsed in the election before. Anonymity prevents the weight of past decisions from slowly calcifying the people into specific persons with controlling
histories.96 In this way, the people have no history, no voting record, and no
affiliation. It is recreated anew in each election to deliberate about the public
good, de novo. Just as an anonymously published argument may have more
force, owing to its depersonalized presentation, maintaining the people as an
abstract embodiment of the thinking of individual citizens, but not their

93. Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942 (May 10, 2019) (reviewing and analyzing the relevant doctrine).
94. This is similar to the way that a prosecutor gains the imprimatur of the people by proceeding on a grand jury indictment.
95. Mahesh Gopinath et al., The Effect of Public Commitment on Resistance to Persuasion,
26 INT’L J. RSCH MKTG, 60 (2009) (finding that making one’s position known increases adherence
to it); Jennifer Lerner and Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 255, 257 (1999).
96. Gopinath et al., (discussing consistency effects); Robert B. Cialdini and Noah J. Goldstein,
Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity, 55 ANN. REV. OF PSYCH. 591 (2003) (discussing
pressure to act consistently with one’s public positions).
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particular characteristics or histories, helps preserve its flexibility and openness to argument.97
By making this point about depersonalization, I am not going back on
my earlier claim that the ideal for public deliberation is not anonymity but
taking responsibility in one’s own name. My point is rather that the dialogue
between representatives and citizens works best when both poles are represented. Public deliberation is fulfilled by representatives taking responsibility for their votes, but it is also well-initiated by preserving the people, as an
experimental, thought-like body.
The second kind of inertia concerns the relationship between voters and
their representatives. Representatives are supposed to govern for the people,
which is to say, those who voted for them and those who did not. If persons
were identified with their vote, interactions between constituents and representatives would be infused with a personal “with me or against me” mentality. That is, politicians could know, when helping a particular constituent
with an issue whether they voted for the candidate or not, rather than reinforcing the voter’s identity as a member of the people.
Notice that my argument is not that anonymity can or should preclude
persons from forming political identities. They may do so in a variety of
ways, such as by being a member of a party, publicly supporting particular
candidates, as well as announcing their voting choices. Instead, my point is
that secret balloting creates a starting point in which one is not affiliated with
a position. Moreover, the secret ballot precludes there being an official record of a person’s voting, even if he avows his electoral choices. This is justified on the ground that such record would constitute the erosion of anonymity of others, even though this will have, in most elections, a negligible
effect.
I have provided two considerations in favor of the secret ballot, but are
they decisive? An important counter-consideration lies in the principle that
citizens must take responsibility for how they exercise political power. It is
one thing to read and speak anonymously in the public sphere, but a political
community is different. For example, though answering questions about the
public good is difficult, citizens have help. A good democracy will foster an
understanding of the role of civic institutions as well as thinking about collective problems faced by the community. As I argued before, representatives, agencies, and courts, not to mention think tanks and newspapers, provide examples of publicly-oriented thinking. Moreover, individual elections
97. See Hui, supra note 56 (better advice from editors if one submits as not a famous person);
Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Many Masks of Anon: Anonymity As Cultural Practice and Reflections in Case Law, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 14 (2013) (“Writing as Publius, Madison, Hamilton,
and Jay wished not only to protect themselves and their reputations but also to persuade solely on
the basis of their arguments, devoid from any bias a reader might attach to their identities. Anonymity granted Publius a chance at persuasion that might not otherwise be attainable with some
readers.”)
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are preceded by campaigns, which provide further education about the relevant issues. Lastly, one could argue that a good democracy should require
open voting but cultivate a default tolerance of how others vote rather than
shield individual voters from taking responsibility for how they vote. Together, these reasons militate in favor of open voting, even if we accept the
view of democracy according to which citizens answer questions about the
public good.
There are reasons on the other side though too. First, voting persons
exercise a symmetrical and equal political power to others, so that though
one is not taking responsibility for how one votes, one’s influence on an
election overall is just as much as anyone else’s. It is not generally true that
persons must only take responsibility for actions they take in positions of
power, but certainly, the exercise of power heightens the need for responsibility. A good leader must take responsibility for what happens in virtue of
having prerogatives to make things go well, as well as having an obligation
to wield those prerogatives carefully. In an election, voting power should be
equal given that two citizens who disagree balance each other’s votes. There
is no doubt the two citizens should talk about their differences, but there are
many opportunities for them to do so, and in any case, a discussion mediated
by other centers of thinking may be more productive. In the meantime, the
exercise of power by these two citizens is reciprocal and frequently renegotiated through regular elections.
As previously discussed, voting for a representative exercises power,
but not for a final view of what the laws will look like. Hence, those who
voted for the losing candidate may still attempt to persuade the elected representative to moderate their position on the relevant issues. Representatives
represent all of their constituents and so should be sensitive to such efforts.
Ultimately, whether voting by citizens should be anonymous is a close
call. It is best justified when voting for representatives as opposed to laws,
as the former can be responsible for conducting public deliberation while
preserving the flexibility of ordinary voters.
C. Citizens as Representatives: Ballot Initiatives

The foregoing discussion helps answer the question of whether signing
a ballot initiative should be something that citizens must do in their own
name. It helps because it has illustrated, very broadly, one way that thinking
“flows” in a democracy. Namely, a public question is posed to citizens who
are thereby mobilized into a segment of “the people.” When this question is
sufficiently difficult, they are entitled to answer anonymously, and in so doing provide a proto-answer to that question. This is then taken up by a public
official as the initial step in taking responsibility for fleshing out and enriching that answer with some corresponding public action (e.g., legislative representative voting for the piece of legislation, or prosecutor bringing
charges).
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Where do ballot initiatives fit in this cycle? They are hard to characterize because they involve ordinary citizens and because their legal effect is
not to enact a bill, but to permit a bill to be enacted directly by citizens rather
than by their representatives. They put specific law on the agenda, but they
don’t actually enact it.
An argument can be made that signatories to a ballot initiative should
be entitled to anonymity, on the grounds that they are only suggested public
actions, purposefully submitted to the public at large for approval. Arguably,
signatories to a successful ballot initiative do not legislate in any determinate
way, but only ask the entire polity to consider a change, in the form of the
ensuing direct vote.
Notwithstanding their suggestive nature, ballot initiatives are public
acts and signing them should be done in one’s own name. The reason being
that a ballot initiative is not a query of the people for which an institution or
official stands ready to take responsibility for the answer in further thinking.
Ballot signatories wish to put an idea on the collective agenda that has, except for the signatories, no spokesperson. Hence, the signatories become the
spokespersons. They must accept that role.
First, ballot signatories are not responding to a question that they might
otherwise have wished to keep thinking about. Rather, they see the initiative
as a good idea, or, at least, they wish others to consider it now.98 They thus
set the timing for the deliberation of others as well as the form it takes (i.e.,
whether the initiative will be enacted will turn on the deliberations of the
members of the polity themselves and not their representatives). This shift
in timing and form is not trivial, as the passage of the initiative may have
follow-on effects, such as giving legislators reason to take up different business than they otherwise would, to respond to the law that was passed to limit
its bad effects, or to make it consistent with other regulatory regimes.
Second, anonymity, if granted to ballot initiative signatories, would not
secure a general participatory right for persons to equally consider a question, at their own pace, but it would protect those who share a particular perspective and have organized on that basis. The supporters of the initiative
conducted their own, selective and informal polling of the public, where only
those who support the initiative are recorded and those who did not sign are
irrelevant, even if their number is comparatively large. This makes a ballot
initiative a one-sided mobilization of the public where supporters are gathered and opponents are filtered out.
This one-sidedness does not make ballot initiatives suspect or wrongful.
Most of politics consist in organizing the like-minded, but the point is that
an attempt to organize those who are like-minded to change the power of
98. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (arguing that petitioner Elmer
Gertz was not a public person because he did not “engage the public’s attention in an attempt to
influence its outcome”).
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other citizens should be done in the name of those who wish to band together.
They are not a manifestation of the people, but rather, are some particular
people who found others who agree with them, and they should be identified
as such.
Third, if the ballot initiative is successful, then the result is a new option
to vote for, but the option does not come with any person who takes responsibility for it, in the sense of advocating it or being a target for questions and
challenges regarding it. The electorate is thus on its own in trying to gauge
its desirability. Further, those who signed the initiative already started thinking about it, have familiarity with it, and ordinarily have been exposed to the
benefits of the proposal by those who favor it. This combination—the lack
of a spokesperson for the law and the comparative expertise of those who
endorsed its proposal, as compared to the ordinary member of the electorate—militates in favor of treating the signatories as stepping into the shoes
of such a spokesperson. Persons may use the identities of those who signed
the ballot initiative as a clue by which to assess the proposal. If the signatories are from a particular group or industry, this may provide information
about how to go about researching the proposal itself.
In summary, signatories to a ballot initiative are a subset of the public
acting, so to speak, sua sponte. While not responding to a question put to
the public, the signatories are wanting to have their own chosen question
taken up. This is not a bad thing. Democracy is well-served by active citizens, but their activity as a particular subset of citizens is what requires publicity. It is activism borne of a particular viewpoint and desire to move it
forward that requires doing it in one’s own name.
Let me note one limitation of the argument. I am not claiming that
ballot initiative signatories are never entitled to anonymity. Rather, I agree
with the concurrence in Doe v. Reed in thinking that ballot initiative signatories may earn anonymity when they can show a cognizable risk that they
will suffer reprisals or harassment.99 I also agree with the concurrence that
absent such a showing, signatories must reveal their names. Where I differ
from the concurrence is in how I reach that latter conclusion. I do not rely
on the sweeping premise that all acts with legislative effect must be public,
or that the exercise of political power must always be public. Instead, I assume only that acts for which one must take responsibility are public. Since
a ballot initiative signatory must, I argued, take responsibility for signing,
their signature must be public, but this is compatible with there being no need
to take responsibility for other acts that exercise political power.

99. Reed, 561 U.S. at 215 (case specific relief is available “in the rare circumstance in which
disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and widespread harassment that the State is
unwilling or unable to control”) (Sotomayor, J., Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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D. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta

The theory I defended in Section I along with my discussion of Doe v.
Reed offers a novel way to view the Supreme Court’s latest precedent on
compelled disclosure: Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta.100
In this case, the Supreme Court considered a rule promulgated by California’s Attorney General. This rule requires various disclosures from organizations that wish to be permitted to solicit tax-exempt donations in California. One such required disclosure is a Schedule B to I.R.S. form 990,
which identifies by name and address donors who give more than a certain
amount of money to the organization.101 The petitioners in the case challenged this rule as a violation of the First Amendment right to freedom of
association, alleging that it “would make their donors less likely to contribute
and would subject them to reprisals.”102 The petitioners challenged it as applied to them, but also facially.103 The Court sustained the facial challenge,
with only Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan disagreeing with that result. They expressed sympathy only with an as-applied challenge.
I think the dissenters are right, but not for the reason they give. Their
main argument is that the majority ignores Doe v. Reed.104 That is, they argue that Bonta raises the same question as Doe, but nonetheless comes out
differently. In Doe v. Reed, the disclosure of the names of ballot signatories
to the public was upheld against a facial challenge without much tailoring,
partly on the grounds that there was no evidence that the typical ballot initiative signatory would be subject to reprisals if their name were disclosed.105
But then in Bonta, the Court held that no evidence for such reprisals
need be found. Rather, a risk can be presumed and that’s enough to require
more tailoring than was found in Doe v. Reed.
1. “[T]he protections of the First Amendment are triggered not only by
actual restrictions on an individual’s ability to join with others to further
shared goals. The risk of a chilling effect on association is enough.”106
2. “[E]xacting scrutiny is triggered by state action which may have the effect
of curtailing the freedom to associate and by the possible deterrent
effect.”107 (emphasis in original)
3. “[I]dentification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful
100. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2380 (“Both organizations challenged the disclosure requirement on its face and as
applied to them.”).
104. Id. at 2395-97.
105. Reed, 561 U.S. at 200-01.
106. Reed, 561 U.S. at 200-01.
107. Id.
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discussions of public matters of importance.”108 (emphasis in original)

This is a disagreement, but not yet one that is anything but a stalemate.
The dissent is right about where the overwhelming bulk of precedent lies,
but normatively, neither side has a decisive argument.
The Bonta dissent thinks that we should assume that many persons will
not be chilled by disclosure of their charitable commitments, making it unimportant whether the disclosure requirement is a little loose in its tailoring.
However, the Bonta majority thinks we should be cautious and take the risk
that persons will be chilled by disclosure of their charitable commitments as
a reason to require tighter tailoring. The dissent can inveigh against the substitution of judicial judgment for that of “politically accountable actors”—it
lets the government operate unless citizens can come forward with evidence
of chill. The majority, on the other hand, can invoke the value of individual
rights against mere “administrative convenience”—it protects the individual
unless the government can show that it has tiptoed around possible chilling.
This stalemate is a symptom of the view I have been at pains to challenge in this Article. Both sides want to evaluate anonymity in terms of who
has a burden to show chilling in some particular circumstances, but there are
costs to placing it on either party, since anonymity is double-edged. It can
hide abuse and fraud, or it can protect unpopular views. Neither scenario
necessarily predominates, so the burden is likely to get the wrong result at
least some of the time.
The privileged participation view offers a different way of approaching
disclosure cases. In line with my analysis of Doe v. Reed, this approach asks
what persons should be responsible for, and to whom. It asks directly about
the kind of thing that is being shielded by anonymity. Doe v. Reed involved
ballot signatories who were seeking to have a significant effect on the political activity of a community, and so they cannot claim anonymity. If they
are going to prompt persons to consider and make binding legal decisions
about an issue, they should do so in their own name. If one is seeking to
make the world over as one would have it, one’s mind is made up, and so
there’s no place for a privilege to make it up.
In Bonta, I also think that anonymity is inappropriate. My reasoning
can be introduced by the example of a legislative representative. Representatives carry out a public function because they act on behalf of their constituents and cannot vote anonymously. Further, the public nature of the representative’s work means that others who seek to interact with representatives
may also take on some obligations of transparency. For example, there are
a variety of disclosure rules for lobbyists which help constituents know who
their leaders are talking to and who is seeking to influence their judgment.109
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (upholding the disclosure requirement
in the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act). See William Luneburg, Anonymity and Its Dubious
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Now apply the same logic to a tax-exempt charity like the challengers
in Bonta. I think it is clear that such charities can be required to disclose
their officers.110 Why? Because charities play a partly public role in society
in virtue of the fact that contributions to them defray the overall tax burden
of the donor. A charity is partly treated as an agent that sufficiently aids
public goals and community interests. It is also entitled to solicit funds from
others, as a charity.111 Hence, there must be a person who can answer for its
activities. But if the officers of a charity can be compelled to reveal their
names, then there is ample reason to hold that large donors must do so as
well because they are likely to have influence with the charity. They are
defraying their public obligations through an avenue of their choice. In the
worst-case scenario, donors may be abusing the tax-exempt status of the
charity or working with it to avoid taxes.
Moreover, large donors are not plausibly settling their views. The
Americans for Prosperity Foundation is only required to disclose the names
of donors who give $250,000 or more. Such donors are plausibly committed
to the cause of the charity and are, again, acting to make over the world as
they wish it to be. Since their actions indicate that they have made up their
mind about what they wish to promote, they can be required to do so in their
own name.
According to these arguments, the key facts are not whether a donor
will or will not be actually chilled by the requirement to disclose their donations to the attorney general, but whether it is fair to require them to give
their name. Perhaps some donors are paranoid about the California attorney
general knowing that they donate a lot to a particular cause. If so, their donations will be chilled, but that consequence cannot be a basis to suspend an
otherwise sound disclosure requirement. And, as I argued, California’s disclosure requirement is sound because of the impact that large donations make
on public life and because of the modest public obligation that they are permitted to fulfill.
Given the inappropriateness of anonymity, I think that California’s interest in manageably policing an expansive charitable trust register is likely
sufficient to protect the disclosure rule from facial invalidation. I say
“likely” because the privileged participation view does not permit disclosure
simply because anonymity is inappropriate without any countervailing

Relevance to the Constitutionality of Lobbying Disclosure Legislation, 19 STANFORD L. & POL’Y
REV. 69 (2008).
110. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958) (“Petitioner has not objected to divulging
the identity of its members who are employed by or hold official positions with it.”).
111. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17510(a) (1999) (West) (legislative findings) (“Many solicitations or sales solicitations for charitable purposes have involved situations where funds are solicited
from the citizens of this state for charitable purposes, but an insignificant amount, if any, of the
money solicited and collected actually is received by any charity. The charitable solicitation industry has a significant impact upon the well-being of the people of this state”).
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government interest. That would be harassment.112 There must be some genuine enforcement value to California obtaining these records, and plausibly,
there is.
Note that the arguments I gave leave room for a grant of anonymity (as
in Doe v. Reed) when others wrongfully attempt to deter donors from exercising their associational rights with threats or violence, or when the Attorney General mishandles the information that is disclosed. The record in
Bonta suggested serious government negligence and even the dissent
claimed that “there is no question that petitioners have shown that their donors reasonably fear reprisals if their identities are publicly exposed.”113 For
these reasons, I think an as-applied challenge against the California disclosure rule is plausible, but that the law on its face is sound.

IV. Conclusion
My goal was to identify and challenge a pervasive assumption: that anonymity is just a state in which one’s identity is unknown to others and that
its importance rests on the effects of that ignorance. If one accepts this assumption, then anonymity rules will be properly analyzed on a case by case,
cost-benefit basis. With regard to each case, the question will be “what do
we want to happen here?” followed by an inquiry into whether anonymity
will satisfactorily advance whatever the answer is (e.g., more dissident
speech, safety from reprisals, etc.). The question of whether to use anonymity will be a purely technical, instrumental one that turns only on the results
it produces compared to other doctrines.
This results-only assumption about the significance of anonymity is too
restrictive. It misses the significance of names as the way in which persons
think about others and, in turn, update their view of them by attributing new
things to them. Anonymity is not just a state in which a person’s identity is
unknown, but also, thereby, a state in which a person cannot be held responsible for what they do. Hence, anonymous speech is speech for which its
speaker cannot be held responsible.
This fact that anonymity precludes holding persons responsible, gives
it inherent moral significance. Because persons should be held responsible
for whatever they are responsible for, anonymity is an exception to, or a
privilege from, the normal moral order of things. Such a privilege requires
justification, and the justification is not wide open. It does not consist of a
sufficient balance of “goodness” however denominated, but is instead one

112. Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980) (invalidating a disclosure requirement that had no justification beyond harassment.); Acorn Inv., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 887 F.2d
219, 226 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[i]n short, there is no logical connection between the City’s legitimate
interest in compliance with the panoramic ordinance and the rule requiring disclosure of the names
of shareholders”).
113. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2405 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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that ensures the realization of the good of anonymity, as a distinct moral practice.
The distinct good of anonymity is that it permits a form of thinking by
which persons can retain the privacy of their thoughts without having to
withhold them from others. With anonymity, one retains privacy in one’s
ideas, not by holding the ideas back, but by holding one’s self back, so that
others cannot identify the one who holds the idea. The justification for anonymity is to privilege participation in community intellectual life.
If we accept this account of what anonymity is, then we will have to
stop evaluating various anonymity practices in terms of what goods they produce. Instead, in each instance of anonymity we will have to ask whether
someone should be held responsible for what they do anonymously. This is
a different question. It requires thinking about the allocation of responsibilities to persons—what should persons have to own and what may they disown? I’ve given one partial answer in this paper: persons may sometimes
disown their thinking, since thinking is a work in progress, and so they
should not have to take responsibility for their early thoughts in order to improve them. If they did, they might choose not to participate in communal
thinking at all, and this is a grave loss to the individual thinker and to their
community.

